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Abstract: Considerable recent work has reached mixed conclusions about
whether and how globalization affects the inflation–output trade-off and
suggests that the ultimate effect of openness on the output–inflation
relationship is influenced by a variety of factors. In this paper, we consider
the impact of exchange-rate pass through and examine how pass through
conditions the effect of openness on the sacrifice ratio. We develop a simple
theoretical model showing how the extent of both pass through and openness
can interact to influence the output–inflation relationship. Next we empirically
explore the nature of these two variables and their interaction. Results
indicate that greater pass through increases the sacrifice ratio, that there is
statistically significant interaction between pass through and openness, and—
once the extent of pass through is taken into account alongside other factors
that affect the sacrifice ratio, such as central bank independence—openness
fails to exert an empirically robust effect on the sacrifice ratio.
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1. Introduction
Does globalization affect inflation? Romer (1993) found a
negative cross-country relationship between inflation and the degree
of openness to international trade. This sparked a number of
theoretical and empirical studies on how openness affects the inflationoutput tradeoff and how this relationship is conditioned upon possible
interactions of openness and other key aspects of the aggregate
economy. Romer suggests that greater openness to trade enhances
negative terms-of-trade effects resulting from domestic output
expansions, thereby reducing the incentive for a central bank to
engage in inflationary policymaking, and Lane (1997) proposes that
greater trade openness reduces the potential output gains from
unexpected inflation in non-traded-goods sectors characterized by
imperfect competition and sticky product prices. Furthermore, Karras
(1999) argues that greater indexation of nominal wages to unexpected
inflation in response to increased trade openness could also reduce the
incentive for central banks to inflate.
The explanations provided by Romer, Lane, and Karras imply
that the effects of openness on the inflation realizations operate by
worsening the terms of the output–inflation trade-off faced by central
banks. Temple (2002), however, has suggested that there is little
cross-country evidence that increased trade openness reduces the
sacrifice ratio. Daniels et al. (2005) propose that once the inflationreducing impact of greater central bank independence is taken into
account, there is evidence in cross-country data that increased trade
openness actually increases the sacrifice ratio, a result inconsistent
with Rogoff's (2006) suggestion that increased globalization tends to
make the Phillips curve steeper. This result, Daniels and VanHoose
(2006) argue, is consistent with a view that greater trade openness
exposes imperfectly competitive firms to greater competition, thereby
reducing their pricing power and effectively increasing the observed
responsiveness of output to changes in the inflation rate. Badinger
(2009) has obtained results consistent with this prediction in an
analysis of data from 91 countries over the 1985–2004 interval.
Recent work has added other elements that can impinge on the
relationship between trade openness and the sacrifice ratio: political
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regime (Caporale and Caporale, 2008), progressivity of income
taxation (Daniels and VanHoose, 2009a), capital mobility (Daniels and
VanHoose, 2009b), labor-market structures (Bowdler and Nunziata,
2010), reliance on imported commodities in production (Pickering and
Valle, 2012).
Nevertheless, Daniels and VanHoose also point out that the
ultimate effects of increased trade openness on the sacrifice ratio
hinge on a number of structural factors likely to vary across countries.
Along this same line, Neiss (2001) suggests that the effect of
openness on inflation becomes more muted—indeed, empirically
insignificant—once markups are taken into account. In addition,
Bowdler (2009) finds that the relationship between openness and the
sacrifice ratio depends on the exchange-rate regime that is in place,
and Cavelaars (2009) suggests that the nature of this relationship
likely is influenced by trade costs. Ball (2006) argues that for the
United States there is in fact no clear evidence that globalization
impinges on the process by which inflation is determined.2 One
contribution of this paper is to provide a new motivation for why the
effects of greater openness on the sacrifice ratio might be theoretically
ambiguous. Our explanation focuses on an interplay between the
degree of openness and the extent of exchange-rate pass through
within a direct price-level effect and an opposing indirect exchangerate effect on the sacrifice ratio. In addition, the paper seeks to
determine the net effects of this interplay by utilizing empirical
measures of the degree of openness and the extent of pass through.
A number of recent studies examine the varying degree of
exchange-rate pass through among economies and changes in passthrough estimates over time. Taylor (2000), for example, argues that
changes in individual expectations regarding price-setting behavior has
led to lower inflation and lower price margins, and, as a consequence,
reduced pass through. Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) maintain that a
greater emphasis on inflation stabilization has led to both lower mean
inflation and a reduced extent of pass through. Based on cross-country
panel estimates, Campa and Goldberg (2005) examine the main
theoretical arguments explaining cross-country differences and
changes over time in exchange-rate pass through. They argue that
inflation performance, nominal exchange-rate volatility, and other
macroeconomic factors play an important but limited role in
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influencing cross-country differences in pass through. Campa and
Goldberg find that changes in the composition of trade—specifically, a
shift to a greater share of manufactures in a country's import bundle—
correlates with a lower extent of pass through. Marazzi et al. (2005)
show that, in addition to the change in the composition of imports, the
growing importance of Chinese trade may have reduced the extent of
U.S. pass through. They suggest that markets experiencing the
greatest reductions in the extent of pass through are those in which
China has recorded an increased market share. At a macroeconomic
level, Flamini (2007) and Adolfson (2007) focus on the design of
optimal monetary policy and show that the effectiveness of monetary
policy can be conditioned upon the degree of exchange-rate pass
through. Hence, accounting for the degree of pass through can
improve monetary policy and thereby reduce mean inflation.
Our objective here is not to add to the debate on the
microeconomic or macroeconomic determinants of the extent of
exchange-rate pass through or regarding the optimal design of
monetary policy in light of partial pass through. Instead, this paper
investigates the effect of exchange-rate pass through on the sacrifice
ratio and the role that the extent of exchange-rate pass through has in
influencing the relationship between the degree of openness to
international trade and the output–inflation trade-off. We begin by
developing a simple theoretical model showing how both the extent of
pass through and the degree of openness can affect the sacrifice ratio
and how these two factors can also interact to influence the sacrifice
ratio. The model illustrates how both factors work through competing
channels, which renders their overall impacts on the sacrifice ratio
theoretically ambiguous. The model also predicts that a greater extent
of pass through either enhances a positive impact or reduces a
negative effect of greater openness on the sacrifice ratio. Finally, the
model indicates that the overall impact of greater openness on the
sacrifice ratio is likely to be indeterminate when considering the
competing effects of key characteristics of the economy, including in
particular the extent of exchange-rate pass through.
Using cross-country data spanning 20 countries for the period
1975 through 2004, we find that there is in fact evidence that the
degree of pass through directly influences the sacrifice ratio and
impinges on the impact of increased openness on the sacrifice ratio.
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Specifically, a greater extent of pass through contributes to a higher
sacrifice ratio and reduces the negative effect of greater openness on
the sacrifice ratio. Additional estimates taking into account the extent
of central bank independence indicate that the net effect of greater
openness on the sacrifice ratio is not empirically robust. Lastly, we
consider the role of wage contracting in the economy as a factor
conditioning the impact of exchange-rate pass through on the sacrifice
ratio. We find that the effect of pass through on the sacrifice ratio
remains positive, is statistically significant, and increases with a
greater extent of wage contracting as measured by union density.
The following section provides a theoretical explanation for
interdependence of the effects of a greater extent of pass through and
an increased degree of openness on the output–inflation relationship
as measured by the sacrifice ratio. Section 3 utilizes cross-country
data on the extent of pass through, the degree of openness, and other
variables relevant to the determination of sacrifice ratios to evaluate
the empirical predictions forthcoming from our theoretical model.
Section 4 summarizes our conclusions.

2. A model of interdependence among pass
through, openness, and the sacrifice ratio
The literature on discretionary policymaking suggests that a
nation's equilibrium inflation rate depends crucially on two key factors:
the preferences of its monetary authority in terms of relative weights
on output versus inflation and the country's output–inflation
relationship faced by the monetary authority. To examine the effects
of a greater extent of pass through on a nation's output–inflation
relationship, we consider an adaptation of the model developed in
Daniels and VanHoose (2006).

2.1. Theoretical model
In the model, there are numerous atomistic sectors, indexed i.
These sectors are distributed uniformly along a unit interval. Each
sector contains large numbers of workers and firms, the latter of which
produce an identical good, which is differentiated from the goods
produced in other sectors. Following Ball (1988) and Duca and
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VanHoose (2000), we assume an identical price elasticity of demand
across sectors for the sake of simplicity and tractability. A portion, Ω,
of firms have workforces that contractually set nominal wages in
advance of labor-market clearing. In the remaining fraction, 1 − Ω, of
firms, spot labor markets determine nominal wages.
As a simplification, we restrict the analysis to wage stickiness as
the only potential source of nominal rigidities in a portion of our model
economy's sectors, rather than including as well a potential role for
price stickiness. In reality, of course, as recently documented by Gwin
and VanHoose (2012), there are real-world sectoral variations in the
degrees of stickiness of both wages and prices, and in principle we
could consider a more complicated model allowing for both sources of
nominal rigidities. As we demonstrate below, however, allowing for
nominal rigidities arising solely from wage stickiness is sufficient to
generate several interrelationships among variables and to yield
contrasting effects of these variables on a nation's sacrifice ratio.
Including additionally a role for sticky prices undoubtedly would
introduce additional channels through which openness and pass
through might affect the sacrifice ratio, but at a substantial cost in
terms of model complexity. Consequently, we eschew consideration of
varying degrees of price flexibility across sectors, which might be a
fruitful avenue of future research.
In our framework, the output produced by a given firm in sector

i is

𝛾𝑖 = 𝛼Ι𝑖 ,
(1)
where yi is the log of output and li is the log of employment at a firm in
sector i. The demand for the output of a firm in sector i as a share of
aggregate domestic output is

𝛾𝑖 − 𝛾 = −𝜀(𝜌𝑖 − 𝜌),
(2)
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where 𝛾 ≡ ∫0 𝛾𝑖 d𝑖 is the log of aggregate domestic output; 𝜌 ≡ ∫0 𝛾𝜌𝑖 d𝑖
is the log of the index of prices charged by domestic firms; and
is the price elasticity of demand.

𝜀>1

Domestic income is determined by the quantity equation,

𝛾 =𝑚−𝑝
(3)
where m is the log of the money stock and the log of velocity has been
normalized at a value of zero. The domestic nation's income–
expenditure equilibrium condition (for a derivation, see, for instance,
Canzoneri and Henderson, 1991; or Bryson et al., 1993) is given by

𝛾 = 𝜂(𝜌Μ + 𝑠 − 𝜌) + (1 − 𝛽)𝛾 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝛾 ∗
(4)
where η is the elasticity of desired spending with respect to the real
exchange rate; β and β∗, which are fractions, are home and foreign
propensities to import; pM is the log of the aggregate level of prices
charged by foreign producers and invoiced in foreign prices; s is the
log of the domestic currency price of foreign currency; and y∗ is the log
of aggregate foreign output.

2.2. Incorporating micro-foundations of exchange-rate
pass through
We incorporate the extent of exchange-rate pass through into
the model along the lines of Campa and Goldberg (2005). We denote
by pM an index of prices charged by foreign producers in the import
market (measured in foreign currency units), which equal a markup,
mu∗, over the marginal costs of foreign producers, mc∗, such that:

𝜌Μ = 𝑚𝑢∗ (𝛾) + 𝛾𝑚𝑐 ∗ ,
(5)
where γ is a parameter measuring the extent of pass through
equal to unity under full pass through versus zero under zero pass
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through. The markup is assumed to be a function of prices
(expressed in foreign currency units) charged by competing
domestic producers, p − s, and an index measure of fixed effects
across the aggregate economy, ɸ:

𝑚𝑢 ∗ (𝛾) = 𝜙 + (1 − 𝛾)(𝑝 − 𝑠).
(6)
The marginal costs of foreign producers are equal to prices charged by
foreign producers in the foreign market, p∗. These prices depend on
wages in the foreign market, w∗, and on demand conditions in the
foreign market, captured by foreign income, y∗. Marginal costs of
foreign producers, therefore, are expressed as

𝑚𝑐 ∗= 𝜑𝑤 ∗ +𝜑𝑦 ∗.
(7)
Hence, prices charged by foreign producers in domestic import
markets are

pM=ϕ+(1-γ)(p-s)+γ(φw*+φy*)
(8)
With the index of fixed effects normalized to unity (so that the log of
this index, ɸ, equals zero), and using p∗ in equation (7), the index of
prices charged by foreign producers in the domestic import market can
be more conveniently expressed as

𝑝𝑀 = (1 − 𝛾)(𝑝 − 𝑠) +γp*.
(9)
This index of prices indicates that under domestic-currency pricing—
that is, zero pass through—γ = 0, and pM = p − s. Under producercurrency pricing or full pass through, γ = 1, and pM = p∗. With
incomplete pass through, 0 < γ < 1. Along the lines of Campa and
Goldberg, this price index allows pass through to depend on underlying
structural elements such as industry structure and competition.
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2.3. The determinants of exchange-rate pass through
As stated earlier, our objective is not to add to the debate on
the determinants of exchange-rate pass through, and so in our model
we treat γ as exogenous. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind
the theoretical determinants of pass through when implementing our
empirical analysis, which employs the elasticity estimates of Campa
and Goldberg.
Beginning with industry characteristics, Dornbush (1987) uses
an industrial-organization approach to model the potential impact of
exchange rate changes on import prices. He argues that, given wage
costs in both the exporting market and in the importing market, the
degree of price adjustment depends on three different aspects:
product substitutability between domestic output and foreign output,
the degree of market integration with the world market, and market
organization or the degree of competition. The elasticity of domestic
prices to exchange rate movements increases with greater competition
among firms in the importing market (relatively homogeneous
products and a large number of domestic firms such that price taking
behavior results) and with an increase in the number of foreign firms
relative to the number of home firms. Recent empirical work by
Bhattacharya et al. (2008) shows considerable variation in the degree
of pass through across U.S. industries.
Numerous authors, including Campa and Goldberg (2005),
argue that the composition of a nation's import basket may affect the
degree of exchange-rate pass through. Specifically, the import basket
of most advanced economies shifted away from a large share of
energy and a small share of manufactures (less than 50 percent) to a
smaller share of energy and larger share of manufactures (over 75
percent). This would influence pass through if there is greater
competition among exporters in the manufactures sector as compared
to the energy sector as the shift would heighten the elasticity of import
demand. Bergin and Feenstra (2009) extend this analysis, showing
that the change in the U.S. import basket from energy to
manufactures further led to an increase in imports from China. They
argue that the shift to imports from China, which pegs the domestic
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currency to the U.S. dollar, made U.S. imports less sensitive to
exchange rate movements.
At a more macro level, Taylor (2000) argues that changes in the
inflation environment to lower average inflation reduced the pricing
power of firms and thereby resulted in lower exchange-rate pass
through. Devereux and Yetman (2010) extends this approach within a
sticky-price model, concluding that pass through increases with
average inflation but at a declining rate. There are a number of
authors whose empirical results support the hypothesis that the
inflation environment affects pass through, including Takhtamanova
(2010), Gagnon and Ihrig (2004), and Shintani et al. (2012). Others
[Adolfson (2007) and Engel (2008) for example] consider a potential
feedback in that the degree of pass through affects the transmission of
exchange rate movements into domestic prices and, therefore, may
condition monetary policy and the resulting inflation level.
Recent empirical studies also indicate that other structural
characteristics may condition pass through. Gust et al. (2010), on the
one hand, claim that an increase in trade openness raises the
responsiveness of exporters to competitors' prices and therefore
reduces pass through. An and Wang (2011), on the other hand, argue
that a higher import share increases pass through, along with higher
inflation, monetary policy variability, smaller country size, and
exchange-rate persistence.
As noted above, the purpose of this paper is not to weigh in on
the empirical determinants of exchange-rate pass through. Instead, it
is to understand if cross-country differences in pass through may
affect the sacrifice ratio. Nonetheless, the literature described above
raises possible collinearity and endogeneity issues that should be
considered in our empirical work in Section 3.

2.4. Exchange-rate pass through and output
If we were to specify analogous structural relationships for a
foreign nation, the result would be a two-country framework in which
y∗ and p∗ would be treated as fully endogenous variables. In order to
concentrate on a basic open-economy setting with the potential for
incomplete pass through, we assume that foreign output and the
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foreign price index are exogenous and equal to a normalized level of
unity. Thus, y∗ and p∗ equal zero, and β∗ in equation (4) becomes
irrelevant to the analysis.
Using anti-logged versions of equation (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5)
in the profit function, PiYi − WiLi, substituting the normalizations Y∗ = 1
(y∗ = 0) and P∗ = 1 (p∗ = 0), and working out the first order condition for
Li yields the log-linear labor demand function for a firm i (with the
intercept suppressed because it plays no role in our subsequent
analysis):

𝑙𝑖𝑑 =

−𝜀(𝑤𝑖 − 𝑝) + 𝜂𝛾(𝑠 − 𝑝) + (1 − 𝛽)(𝑚 − 𝑝)
,
𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀
(10)

where wi is the log of the nominal wage for the firm.
Workers can consume both domestically produced output and
foreign-produced goods. Consequently, labor supply to firms depends
on the real wage computed in terms of the overall price workers pay
for a basket of both domestic and foreign goods, where the consumer
price index is (1 − 𝛽)𝑝 + 𝛽(𝑝𝑀 + 𝑠) and λ > 0 is the labor supply
elasticity:

𝑙𝑖𝑠 = 𝜆[𝑤𝑖 − (1 − 𝛽𝛾)𝑝 − 𝛽𝛾𝑠].
(11)
For firms with or without nominal wage contracts, the full-information,
market-clearing wage satisfies (10) and (11) simultaneously and
equals

𝑤
̂𝑖 =

[𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀)𝛽 + 𝜂]𝛾(𝑠 − 𝑝) + (1 − 𝛽)(𝑚 − 𝑝)
.
[𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀) + 𝜀]
(12)

Hence, this nominal wage rate, which is the wage actually paid in
sector i if it is among the share, 1 − Ω, of sectors without nominal
wage contracts, depends positively on the extent of pass through.
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Substitution of (12) into either (10) or (11) and the result into (1)
yields output of a noncontract firm with market-clearing (mc) wages:

𝑦𝑖𝑚𝑐 = 𝛼𝜆

((𝜂 − 𝛽𝜀)𝛾(𝑠 − 𝑝) + (1 − 𝛽)(𝑚 − 𝑝)
.
[𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀) + 𝜀])
(13)

Thus, output of firms in sectors without wage contracts
responds ambiguously to an increased degree of pass through. This
ambiguity can be understood by considering the direct and indirect
effects of variations in the extent of pass through. The direct effect of
a greater extent of pass through occurs via an increase in consumer
price inflation as a consequence of higher prices of imported goods.
The indirect effect of an enlarged degree of pass through takes place
via a change in the real exchange rate, which affects domestic output
by altering relative prices. In equation (13), a greater extent of pass
through increases the magnitude of γ and thereby raises the demand
for domestic output and thus non-contracting firms' demand for labor.
Hence, the indirect effect of an increased degree of pass through is a
positive dependence of output on the magnitude of γ operating
through the η coefficient in the first term of the numerator of the ratio
within parentheses in (13). At the same time, however, an increase in
the extent of the direct effect of pass through boosts the level of prices
of imported foreign goods, which raises the consumer price index,
induces a decline in labor supply, and thereby tends to reduce
employment and output in sectors with market-clearing wages. Thus,
the direct effect results in a contrasting negative dependence on the
magnitude of γ. This effect operates through the βε coefficient in the
first term of the numerator of the ratio within parentheses in (13). On
net, therefore, the impact of a larger degree of pass through on output
of non-contracting firms is indeterminate.
For atomistic wage setters within the fraction, Ω, of firms in
sectors with nominal wage contracts, the contract wage is equal to the
expected value of the market clearing wage, 𝑤𝑖𝑐 = 𝑤
̂ 𝑖𝑒 . Hence, from
(10) and (1), the output of a firm with wage contracts is
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𝑦𝑖𝑐

−𝛼𝜀(𝑤
̂𝑖𝑒 − 𝑝) + 𝜂𝛾(𝑠 − 𝑝) + 𝛼(1 − 𝛽)(𝑚 − 𝑝)
=
.
(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀)
(14)

Because wages are fixed in this sector, pass through affects
output only through the indirect, real-exchange-rate channel, through
which output at firms with wage contracts unambiguously responds
positively to an increased extent of pass through. The demand for
output of domestic firms depends positively on the real exchange rate;
that is, in logs, an increase in the differential between the exchangerate-adjusted index of prices charged in domestic markets by foreign
firms and the index of domestic firms' prices pushes up the demand
for domestic output. Consequently, a greater degree of pass through
boosts the real exchange rate and raises the derived demand for labor
by domestic firms. With nominal wages set by contracts, the result is a
rise in domestic employment and hence domestic output.

2.5. The sacrifice ratio: comparative statics and
ambiguous price versus exchange-rate effects
Most theoretical analyses focus on a nation's sacrifice ratio
expressed in terms of a direct relationship between its output and
price level. Sacrifice ratios examined empirically by Ball (1994) and
other authors, however, typically are computed using CPI inflation
rates, which incorporate effects of exchange-rate variations as well as
changes in the index of prices of domestic firms. Our analysis,
therefore, considers both the direct responsiveness of the nation's
domestic output to a change in the domestic price level and the
indirect output responsiveness to a change in the exchange rate. To
highlight the different mechanisms of output responses to the price
level versus the exchange rate, we compute the effects on output of
changes in each of these variables separately. Firms behave
identically, so that 𝑦𝑖𝑐 = 𝑦 𝑐 for all i ∈ [0, Ω ] and 𝑦𝑖𝑚𝑐 = 𝑦 𝑚𝑐 for all
i ∈ (Ω, 1]. It follows that y = Ωy c + (1 − Ω)y mc . Substituting from
(12) and (13) and differentiating with respect to the index of domestic
firms' price level yields the following expression for the response of
aggregate domestic output to a change in the domestic price level
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𝜕𝑦 𝛺{𝛼[𝜀 − (1 − 𝛽)] − 𝛼𝜂𝛾} (1 − 𝛺)𝜆𝛼[(𝛽𝜀 − 𝜂)𝛾 − (1 − 𝛽)]
=
+
.
𝜕𝑝
𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀
𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀) + 𝜀
(15)
Under imperfect competition, there are no firm-level supply
curves and no aggregate supply relationship. Consequently, the
expression in (15) is the slope of the relationship between the
aggregate output of profit-maximizing price-setting firms and the
overall level of prices set by these firms. If markets are sufficiently
non-competitive, it is feasible for this slope to be negative, because
profit-maximizing firms with considerable monopoly power seek to
restrain output substantially in order to boost prices. Hence, computed
solely with respect to an increase in the index of domestic firms'
prices, the domestic sacrifice ratio is positive for a sufficiently large
value of ε—that is, if the degree of competition is sufficiently high.
Differentiating (15) with respect to β yields 𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑝)/𝜕𝛽 =
(Ω𝛼)/(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀) + [(1 − Ω)𝛼𝜆(𝜀𝛾 + 1)]/[𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀) + 𝜀] > 0. Thus,
as in Daniels and VanHoose (2006), one prediction forthcoming from
this model is that, with respect to the index of domestic firms' prices,
an increase in the extent to which the nation's economy is open to
international trade boosts the sacrifice ratio. This is so because greater
openness renders desired expenditures on domestic output less
sensitive to variations in aggregate domestic income, which makes
each firm's profit-maximizing price less responsive to a change in
aggregate domestic output. As a consequence, in a more open
economy, greater variations in output will be observed for given
variations in the index of prices charged by domestic firms.
Differentiating (15) with respect to γ yields 𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑝)/𝜕𝛾 =
𝛼(((1 − Ω)𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀)𝛽𝜀 − [𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀) + Ω𝜀]𝜂)/(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀)), the
sign of which is indeterminate. Note that in this expression, if Ω = 1,
so that all sectors of the economy utilize nominal wage contracts,
𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑝)/𝜕𝛾𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑝)/𝜕𝛾 < 0 follows unambiguously. In this special
case, a greater extent of pass through makes the index of prices
charged in domestic markets by foreign firms less sensitive to
variations in the real exchange rate brought about by changes in
prices charged by domestic firms, which makes the demand for
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domestic output less sensitive to variations in the index of domestic
firms' prices. Thus, a larger degree of pass through reduces the
sacrifice ratio in an all-contracting economy. This result is comparable
to Flamini's (2007) finding, in the context of a theoretical framework in
which nominal rigidities instead arise from price stickiness and impinge
on multiple exchange-rate channels, that greater pass through reduces
the responsiveness of the variability of the output gap to the variability
of inflation. In Flamini's general-equilibrium model, a monetary
authority's utilization of an inflation-targeting procedure induces
endogenous responses of agents that yield a net effect of a negative
influence of increased pass through on the sacrifice ratio. In our
simpler framework, an analogous outcome arises as well through a
real-exchange rate effect that exists in the absence of policymaking
choices by a monetary authority.
In contrast, if Ω = 0, so that all sectors of the economy have
market-determined nominal wages, 𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑝)/𝜕𝛾𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑝)/𝜕𝛾 > 0. In
an open economy, a greater degree of pass through generates an
enlarged sensitivity of domestic-market prices to foreign firms' prices
and thereby causes domestic output to respond more strongly to
changes in the sacrifice ratio. Thus, in an economy in without nominal
rigidities, our model yields an outcome contradictory to Flamini's, in
which greater pass through induces domestic output to adjust more
flexibly in association with a domestic price-level change, resulting in a
larger predicted sacrifice-ratio response to domestic price inflation.
It follows then in an economy made up of both sectors with
nominal wage contracts and sectors with market-clearing wages
(that is, 0 < Ω < 1), the theoretically predicted effect of an increased
degree of pass through on the sacrifice ratio is ambiguous. Only
empirical analysis could determine whether the net effect is positive or
negative.
In addition, 𝜕((𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑝)/𝜕𝛽))/𝜕𝛾 = ((1 − Ω)𝛼𝜆𝜀/[𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀) +
𝜀] > 0. A greater extent of pass through further stimulates inflationinduced production in market-clearing sectors. A rise in γ boosts the
direct effect operating through the βε coefficient in the output
expressions for output of market-clearing firms in (13) that was noted
above, thus enhancing the impact that greater openness has on prices
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charged by domestic firms and their effects on domestic output. Thus,
an enlarged degree of pass through enhances the positive effect of a
greater degree of openness on the sacrifice ratio expressed only in
terms of domestic prices.
In an open economy, however, exchange-rate variations
influence consumer prices and consequently impinge on the sacrifice
ratio alongside changes in domestic prices. Thus, a full analysis of the
sacrifice-ratio implications of greater openness must take into account
the responsiveness of the nation's output to a change in the exchange
rate. From (13) and (14), differentiating aggregate output with respect
to the exchange rate yields

𝜕𝑦
𝛺𝛼𝜂𝛾
(1 − 𝛺)𝜆𝛼(𝛽𝜀 − 𝜂)𝛾
=
−
.
𝜕𝑠 𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀
𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀) + 𝜀
(16)
This expression is ambiguous in sign but is more likely to be
negative for a sufficiently large value of ε, because under this condition
the predominant effect of domestic currency depreciation is to reduce
the real wage rate and hence reduce labor supply and output. Note
that the effect of greater openness on the output impact of the
exchange rate is given by 𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑠)/𝜕𝛽 = ((1 − Ω)𝛼𝜆𝜀𝛾/𝜆(𝛼 + 𝜀 − 𝛼𝜀) +
𝜀) < 0. Consequently, in contrast to the positive impact that a greater
degree of trade openness has on the sacrifice ratio via the domestic
price channel, increased openness has a negative effect on the
sacrifice ratio via the real-exchange-rate channel, and this negative
impact of openness is enlarged with a greater extent of pass-through
(a higher value of γ).
Could the negative effect of greater openness generated
through the domestic real-currency-depreciation channel more than
offset the positive openness effect operating through an increase in
the index of prices at domestic firms? Potentially, the answer is yes. If
exchange-rate overshooting is commonplace, for example, then a rise
in the nominal exchange rate could exceed an increase in the domestic
price index. If the degree of overshooting is regularly sufficiently large,
then the net effect of openness on the sacrifice ratio could be
negative—if the degree of pass through is also sufficiently large.
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As in the case of the pass-through influence on the sacrifice
ratio operating through the direct effect on output of a variation in the
price level, a change in the degree of pass through exerts an
ambiguous influence via the indirect, exchange-rate effect. Equation
(16) indicates that if 𝛺 = 0, so that nominal wage contracts exist in all
sectors of the nation's economy, 𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑠)/𝜕𝛾𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑠)/𝜕𝛾 < 0,
whereas if 𝛺 = 1, so that nominal wages throughout the economy are
market-determined, 𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑠)/𝜕𝛾𝜕(𝜕𝑦/𝜕𝑠)/𝜕𝛾 > 0. These signs are
reversed relative to the contracted-wage/flexible-wage cases discussed
above with respect to the direct channel operating from the domestic
price level to real output. Hence, as is true for the theoretical effects of
greater openness on the sacrifice ratio, the influences of increased
pass through on the sacrifice ratio operating through the direct pricelevel and indirect exchange-rate channel are exactly opposed, which
yields ambiguous predictions.
To summarize, the impacts of both an increased degree of
openness and a greater extent of exchange-rate pass through on the
sacrifice ratio operate through opposing direct and indirect channels.
The direct, domestic-price channel yields a positive impact on the
sacrifice ratio, and the indirect, real-exchange-rate channel yields a
negative sacrifice-ratio effect. Of course, on net the overall effects of
an increased degree of openness and a greater extent of pass through
operating via both channels simultaneously is ambiguous.
Furthermore, the overall effect of greater trade openness is
conditioned on interactions among the degree of openness and other
key characteristics of the economy, in particular the extent of
exchange-rate pass through. The theoretical importance of accounting
for such interactions may help to explain why Daniels et al. (2005) and
Bowdler (2009)—who fail to consider a role for the extent of pass
through—reach opposing conclusions on the effects of a greater
degree of openness on the sacrifice ratio. Thus, our empirical work
that follows seeks to take into account interactions among all of these
variables.
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3. Empirical evidence on pass through, openness,
and the sacrifice ratio
The key empirical implications of our theoretical model are as
follows:
i)the predicted effect of a greater degree of openness on the sacrifice
ratio is theoretically ambiguous, depending on whether pricelevel or real-exchange-rate channel predominates, and can only
be determined empirically;
ii)the predicted impact of a greater extent of exchange-rate pass
through on the sacrifice ratio is theoretically ambiguous,
depending on the relative share of the economy with flexible
versus contracted nominal wages, and can only be determined
empirically;
iii)an increased extent of pass through enhances (reduces) a positive
(negative) effect of openness on the sacrifice ratio.

3.1. Dependent variable: the sacrifice ratio
We begin the empirical analysis with the estimates of the
sacrifice ratio from Bowdler (2009). These estimates cover the period
1981 through 1998. We extend the data in both directions, estimating
the sacrifice ratio from 1975 through 2004. These estimates are
consistent with Bowdler (and hence the procedure of Ball, 1994) and
are likewise based on data from the International Monetary Fund's
International Financial Statistics.3
The independent variable of analysis, the sacrifice ratio, SAC, is
the ratio of the reduction in trend output to the associated change in
trend inflation for a given disinflationary period. Trend inflation is
measured as average inflation over eight quarters, centered on a given
year, so that trend inflation for year t is the average over the last two
quarters of year t − 1 through the first two quarters of t + 1. A
disinflation period is defined as a period in which trend inflation
declines by more than 1.5 percent from a peak to a trough. The length
of a disinflationary period is then measured in years and varies from
observation to observation. These calculations are made for 20
advanced economies resulting in 69 observations. Table 1 provides
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summary statistics for all variables and Table 2 provides a correlation
matrix.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for 20 countries, 1975–2004.a
Variable

Mean
Overall

SAC

N = 69

Between

1.0983

0.2895

4.8785

n = 20

Within

1.5011

−1.3359

8.3811

T = 3.45

2.0264

1.0000

11.0000

N = 69

1.3109

2.8000

9.5000

n = 20

1.7062

1.7283

9.2283

T = 3.45

6.3224

1.2708

27.5863

N = 69

Between

4.0753

5.9309

21.7710

n = 20

Within

4.8358

−2.6974

21.8908

T = 3.45

Overall

Overall

4.4783

10.5547

4.1652

1.5288

17.9950

N = 69

Between

2.1370

3.2730

11.0450

n = 20

Within

3.6398

−1.1506

15.2825

T = 3.45

0.1979

0.1505

0.9314

N = 69

0.2153

0.1505

0.9314

n = 20

12.1045

10.0800

65.6100

N = 69

12.7211

10.0800

65.6100

n = 20

Overall
CBI

Observationsb

10.5290

Within

ΔInflation

Max

−1.1910

Between

Inflation

Min

1.7938

Overall
Length

1.4933

Std. Dev.

6.2683

0.4452

Between

T = 3.45
Overall
Openness

29.4823

Between

T = 3.45
Overall
Pass Through

0.6512

Between

0.2905

0.1000

1.1300

N = 65

0.2833

0.1000

1.1300

n = 19

0.0130

0.0458

0.0968

N = 69

0.0136

0.0458

0.0968

n = 20

8.5543

76.9583

112.8125

N = 69

8.3788

76.9583

112.8125

n = 20

T = 3.42105
Overall
Concentration

0.0628

Between

T = 3.45
Overall
Propensity

102.7854

Between

T = 3.45
Overall
Union Density

18.4502

9.99

79.42

N = 69

Between

44.2573

18.0195

11.77

77.6775

n = 20

Within

6.9735

19.3198

65.4197

T = 3.45

aAustralia,

Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.
bN

provides the number of total observations, n the number of cross sections,
and T the average number of observations per cross section.
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Table 2. Correlation of explanatory variables.
Length

Inflation ΔInflation

CBI

Length

1

Inflation

0.0409

1

ΔInflation

0.4134

0.8091

CBI

−0.0534 −0.3168

−0.213

1

Openness

−0.0045 −0.0167

−0.0082

−0.0316

1

Pass
Through

0.1346

0.005

0.0376

−0.2623

Union
Density

−0.1190 0.1873

0.0667

−0.2482 0.2904

−0.0194

Pass
Through

Openness

Union
Density

1

1
−0.3086

1

Correlation coefficients in bold are significant at the 10 percent level.

As shown in Table 1, the sacrifice ratio ranges from a minimum
of −1.191 to a maximum of 10.529. The length of each disinflationary
period, Length, is one of our independent variables, and ranges from a
minimum of one year to a maximum of 11 years. Not only does the
length of each disinflationary period vary; so does the number of
observations per country. As shown in Table 1, the average number of
observations (T) per country is 3.45, with a minimum of 2
observations for Germany and Spain to a maximum of 5 observations
for Australia. Table 1 also provides the overall standard deviation
(1.794) as well as the between (1.098) and within standard deviation
(1.501).

3.2. Independent variables
Our independent variables of analysis include those shown to be
important by the existing literature. The initial level of inflation is
measured at the peak and labeled Inflation in the following data
tables. The change in inflation from the peak to the trough is labeled
ΔInflation. The Inflation, ΔInflation, and Length measures vary for
each disinflationary period and, therefore, vary both across country
and within country. Ball (1994) shows that faster disinflations or the
“cold turkey” approach results in a lower loss of output than a
gradualist approach. Hence, ΔInflation is expected to have a negative
relationship with SAC, while Length is expected to have a positive
relationship. Ball's results for the initial level of inflation, Inflation,
were insignificant.
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For the reasons spelled out by Daniels et al. (2005), we augment this
data with their measure of central bank independence, CBI, derived
from Franzese (2002). As with openness, CBI does not vary over time
and has no within-cross-section variation. Daniels et al. show that
greater central bank independence has a positive impact on the
sacrifice ratio.
We also include a measure of the degree of trade openness,
Openness. Romer (1993) is a key contribution to the literature on the
impact of openness on inflation outcomes. Romer argues that
equilibrium inflation is lower in more open economies as policymakers
have less of an incentive to pursue expansionary policies as the
economy becomes more open. In his empirical analysis he considers
only the cross-section variation of openness (the average over the
sample period) to minimize potential endogeneity between openness
and inflation. Instrumental variable analysis provides no evidence that
empirical relationship between openness and inflation results from the
potential endogeneity. As a result of this work, the bulk of the
literature on the impact of openness on the sacrifice ratio follows
Romer by measuring the degree of openness as the average of the
annual ratio of imports to GDP over the entire sample period. This
measure is taken from the World Development Indicators.
As explained in the introduction, evidence on the effect of
openness on the sacrifice ratio is mixed. This effect is likely to depend
on cross-country structural characteristics, such as CBI and exchangerate pass through. Hence, to capture cross-country variation in
exchange-rate pass through, we include Campa and Goldberg's (2005)
estimates of the extent of nominal exchange-rate pass through
elasticity spanning the period 1975 through 2003, Pass Through. We
use this elasticity measure because, as Campa and Goldberg argue, it
has a direct economic interpretation and is the most relevant measure
of the impact of exchange rate changes on inflation performance. Note
that Campa and Goldberg empirically estimate exchange-rate pass
through implementing a variation of equation (8) above

𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑤𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 ,
(17)
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where wt is a control variable for exporter costs and yt is real income
of the importing economy.4 Their estimates reflect the impact of a
one-percent fluctuation of the nominal exchange rate on import prices
as discussed in the theoretical model presented in the previous
section. Hence, a pass-through estimate of 0.65 (the mean value in
our sample of countries) implies that a one percent depreciation of the
domestic currency would result in a 0.65 percent increase in the
import price index of the domestic country.
Campa and Goldberg provide both short-run estimates (the
coefficient on the one-quarter lag of the nominal exchange rate) and
long-run estimates (the sum of the four-quarter lags of the nominal
exchange rate) that result from a regression of import prices on lags of
the nominal exchange rate and other controls. We use the long-run
estimates, because they are consistent with our annual estimates of
trend inflation and the sacrifice ratio. In addition, their pass-through
estimates represent average pass through for the sample period
(which corresponds with our period of analysis). It is important to
point out that Campa and Goldberg consider whether the degree of
pass through has declined over time. Based on two different stability
tests, they reject stability of short-run pass through for a subset of
countries. They are unable to reject stability of long-run pass through,
however. Hence, we consider only the cross-section variation in longrun pass through to minimize potential endogeneity between inflation
and pass through that might arise if inflation influences exporters'
ability to pass through exchange rate changes. In our empirical work
below, we test for endogeneity and offer instrument variable (IV)
regressions as tests of robustness.

3.3. Empirical model and results
Because the key variable of analysis, the degree of openness,
the level of central bank independence, and the extent of pass through
are all time invariant, a random effects model is employed. Due to the
number of observations and the nature of the data set, Daniels et al.
and Bowdler suggest testing for potential outliers. Therefore, we test
for outliers by specifying a regression equation with the sacrifice ratio
as the dependent variable and Inflation, ΔInflation, Length, CBI,
Openness, and a constant as regressors. We use the DFITS statistics
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as our criterion for the detection of outliers. Following Maddala (2001),
we control for the influence of outliers using bounded influence
estimation.5
The Breusch–Pagen/Cook–Weisberg test is used to test for
heteroskedasticity. This test rejects the null hypothesis of constant
variance. Hence, all of the subsequent regression models report robust
standard errors. Furthermore, following Caporale and Caporale (2008),
we also control for the clustering of error terms at the country level.
Regression Model 1 in Table 3 is a base specification that
includes standard determinants of the sacrifice ratio; Inflation,
ΔInflation, Length, CBI, and Openness. As in Ball and Bowdler, the
length of the disinflationary period remains a key determinant of the
sacrifice ratio. There are important differences regarding effects of
other variables, however. First, the coefficient estimate for CBI is,
consistent with Daniels et al. (2005), positive and significant.
Additionally, Bowdler reports “weak” evidence linking the change in
inflation to SAC, whereas our results are significant at the 1 percent
level. More importantly, Bowdler also reports a weak negative
correlation between Openness and SAC, whereas our results are
significant at the 5 percent level. These differences are likely an
outcome of the larger data set (a longer time horizon in both
directions) that we employ. Recall that the results of the theoretical
model imply that a negative effect of greater openness on the sacrifice
ratio results if the indirect, longer-term effect operating through the
real-exchange-rate channel predominates over the direct, shorter-term
positive impact operating through the domestic-price channel. These
results are suggestive of an interpretation that—in the context of the
more recent data explored here and by Bowdler—the real-exchangerate exchange rate channel has become empirically more important
over time.
Table 3. Sacrifice ratio estimates for 20 countries, 1975–2004a (robust
standard errors in second row).
Model 1
Length
Inflation

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

0.6915***

0.6587***

0.6654***

0.6662***

0.5989***

0.1008

0.091

0.0964

0.0969

0.1215

0.0409

0.0381

0.0361

0.0361

0.0245

0.0343

0.0307

0.0346

0.0343

0.1214
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ΔInflation
CBI
Openness

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

−0.2233***

−0.2134***

−0.2150***

−0.2150***

−0.1444

0.0663

0.0581

0.0636

0.0632

0.0500

1.4726**

1.4738**

1.4294**

1.3616**

0.7846**

0.5732

0.5972

0.5196

0.5458

0.4756

−0.0314**

−0.0266***

−0.0266***

−0.0184***

0.0125

0.0091

0.0100

0.0067

1.1704*

0.8657**

0.0389*

1.3476*

0.5961

0.4031

0.0204

0.5655

5.7812***

4.1804**

5.4072***

5.5768***

5.5768***

Pass Through
Constant

Model 5

1.602

1.5421

1.485

1.5242

0.7526

Observations

69

69

69

69

69

R-squared

0.6768

0.6581

0.6965

0.6916

0.6224

0.6455

0.625

0.6617

0.6562

0.3941

14.63

13.59

12.72

12.62

6.28

R-Barb
F

b

*Significant

at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1%
level, for two-tailed test.
aAll models control for clustering at the country level.
bUncentered R2 and centered R2 Model 5.

Although our main interest is how pass through might condition
the effect of openness on the sacrifice ratio, Model 2 drops Openness
and adds Pass Through to the base model to consider a potential
independent effect. In Model 2, the coefficient estimate for Pass
Through is positive and statistically significant at the 6 percent level.
Furthermore, its inclusion has little impact on the sign and significance
of the other model variables. This result suggests that countries with a
greater degree of exchange-rate pass through tend to have a larger
sacrifice ratio, consistent with the effects of variations in the extent of
pass through operating primarily through the direct, domestic-price
channel.
Model 3 includes both Openness and Pass Through. The
inclusion of both variables lowers the p-value of Openness to 1 percent
and the p-value of Pass Through to 4.5 percent.6 The estimates of this
model suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in Openness
results in a 0.37 decrease in the SAC, whereas a one-standarddeviation increase in Pass Through results in a 0.27 increase in the
SAC. These individual effects of Openness and Pass Through on SAC
are illustrated in added-variable plots in Figs. 1 and 2. Fig. 1 plots the
residuals of a regression of Openness (as the dependent variable) on
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all other model variables against the residuals of a regression of SAC
(as the dependent variable) on all other variables except Openness,
thereby isolating the impact of Openness on SAC. Fig. 2 provides the
corresponding plot for Pass Through.

Fig. 1. Individual marginal effect of openness.

Fig. 2. Individual marginal effect of pass through.

Models 4 and 5 address the potential for endogeneity between
exchange rate pass through and inflation. Model 4 takes a very simple
approach and uses the rank order of the pass through estimates
across the countries in the sample as an instrument. The results differ
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only slightly from Model 3 in that the p-value for Pass Through (using
the rank) rises to 0.072.
Model 5 is motivated by the fact, discussed in section 2, that the
composition of a nation's import bundle may be an important factor in
explaining exchange-rate pass through into import prices, especially
the rise in the share of manufactured goods in the import basket.
Following this argument, we use two different measures of the
structure of a nation's trade to instrument for exchange-rate pass
through. The first measure is the value of a concentration index of
merchandise imports centered on the year 1995. The measure is a
Herfindahl–Hirschman index of the degree of market concentration
normalized to value ranging from zero to one, with one indicating
maximum concentration. The concentration variable and a description
of its construction is available through UNCTAD STAT. It is assumed
that increased market concentration reflects a greater share of
manufactured goods within merchandise imports, which, according to
Campa and Goldberg, results in reduced pass through.
The second measure of trade structure is the average value for
the country's import propensity score for manufactured goods,
available from the Structural Analysis Database (STAN) of the OECD.
This measure shows the country's imports for manufactured goods,
relative to its total imports, divided by manufactured goods imports of
the 23 OECD countries relative to the 23 OECD countries' total
imports. It is benchmarked at 100 so that values above 100 indicate
that the country tends to have a “high propensity,” relative to the
OECD, to import manufactured goods. A higher propensity to import
manufactured goods is assumed to result in reduced pass through.
Although both variables show a positive correlation with Openness,
they also display a negative correlation (and with a greater correlation
coefficient) with Pass Through.7
Table 3 provides the results of Model 5's Two-Stage-GMM IV
regression using the concentration index and propensity score as
instruments for pass through. The results show only a slight change,
with the significance level for ΔInflation rising slightly above 10
percent (p = 0.106). Using this model, we first test the potential
endogeneity of the pass through variable. Based on the C statistic
(difference-in-Sargan statistic), we are unable to reject the null
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hypothesis that Pass Through is exogenous. Continuing with the
diagnostics of the IV regression, the Angrist–Pischke multivariate F
test of excluded regressors indicates that the two instruments are
jointly significant at the 1 percent level in the first-stage regression,
and the Kleibergen–Paap LM statistic rejects under-identification of the
first-stage regression. The Cragg–Donald Wald F statistic for the
Weak-Identification test is 17.64, falling between the 10 percent and
15 percent Stock-Yogo critical values. These results fail to provide
evidence that potential endogeneity is likely to be the source of the
positive and significant result for Pass Through on the sacrifice ratio.
We next consider the interactions of Openness, CBI, and Pass Through
using the original Pass Through variable. Model 6 of Table 4 includes
an interaction term between Pass Through and Openness. Our theory
suggests that a greater extent of exchange-rate pass through
enhances an output expansion generated by a higher price level in
nominal-wage-contracting sectors, boosting the positive impact of a
greater degree of openness on the sacrifice ratio via the direct
channel.8 Consistent with this theoretical prediction, the estimated
coefficient on this interaction term is positive and statistically
significant. Note that the estimated total marginal effect of Openness
on the sacrifice ratio in Model 6 is the sum of the coefficient on
Openness plus the coefficient on the Openness-Pass Through
interaction term, PT·Openness, times a given value for Pass Through.
Evaluated at the mean value for Pass Through, the total estimated
marginal effect of Openness on the sacrifice ratio remains negative
and statistically significant. Fig. 3 illustrates the total marginal effect of
Openness on SAC, taking into account the interaction with Pass
Through. Fig. 3 also includes the point estimates for each individual
country given in light of each nation's unique measure of Pass Through
(plotted on the right-hand axis), along with a histogram of the Pass
Through measures (plotted on the left-hand axis). For reference
purposes, the individual marginal effect of Openness on SAC is
illustrated by the solid horizontal line.
Table 4. Sacrifice ratio estimates for 20 countries, 1975–2004a (robust
standard errors in second row).
Model 6
Length

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

Model 10

0.6599***

0.6633***

0.6643***

0.6694***

0.6712***

0.1063

0.0971

0.0969

0.0996

0.0959
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Model 6
Inflation
ΔInflation
CBI
Openness
Pass Through

Model 7

Model 8

Model 10

0.0267

0.0295

0.0305

0.0263

0.0147

0.0375

0.0349

0.0360

0.0356

0.0391

−0.2027**

−0.2074***

−0.2087***

−0.2060***

−0.1940**

0.0720

−0.0645

0.0651

0.0648

0.0693

1.3965**

3.6094**

2.8324***

1.6341***

1.3285**

0.5455

1.5627

0.6522

0.4667

0.4733

−0.0582***

0.0094

−0.0267**

−0.0301***

−0.0297***

0.0119

0.0276

0.0094

0.0085

0.0071

−0.9089

0.9090**

1.7919***

1.0244**

−1.2289

0.5604

0.4241

0.4510

0.3836

0.7983

0.0118**

−0.0236*

0.0053

0.0182

Union Density
PT·Openness

Model 9

0.0538***
0.0164
−0.0758

CBI·Openness

0.0548
−2.1474**

CBI·PT

0.8515
0.0522***

PT·Union Dens.

0.0182
6.7422***

4.4495***

4.8563***

4.8108***

6.6061***

1.7476

1.4111

1.4206

1.3297

1.4772

Observations

69

69

69

69

69

R-squared

0.7164

0.7004

0.7013

0.7073

0.7237

R-Bar

0.6786

0.6605

0.6615

0.6683

0.6816

F

16.93

11.39

12.23

15.32

23.01

Constant

*Significant

at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1%
level, for two-tailed test.
aAll models control for clustering at the country level.
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Fig. 3. Estimated total marginal effect of openness on SAC.

Model 7 drops the interaction of Pass Through and Openness
and controls for a potential interplay between CBI and Openness, as
suggested by Daniels et al. Once this interaction is taken into account,
the coefficient estimate for Openness is no longer statistically
significant. This finding is consistent with the theoretical model
presented in Section 2 and with the more recent results of Bowdler.9
Models 6 and 7 suggest that the overall impact of openness on the
sacrifice ratio depends on interacting structural parameters of the
macroeconomy. Once the full scope of these interactions is taken into
account, the impact of Openness on the sacrifice ratio is not
statistically robust.
Model 8 explores a potential interaction between CBI and Pass
Through by including this interaction and dropping the pass-throughopenness interaction. Daniels et al. (2005) suggest that greater CBI
leads to greater nominal wage contracting and a larger sacrifice ratio.
Greater CBI and greater nominal wage contracting would also leave
less scope for exchange-rate pass through to independently exert a
positive influence on the sacrifice ratio. This conclusion suggests a
negative coefficient estimate for the CBI-Pass Through interaction
term. The estimate of the interaction term is indeed negative and
statistically significant, providing some empirical support for this
argument.
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In addition to the empirical models summarized in Tables 3 and
4, we also examined how the extent of wage contracting within the
economy conditions the effect of exchange-rate pass through on the
sacrifice ratio. This is motivated by both the theoretical model of
Section 2 and the recent work of Nickell et al. (2005) and Bowdler and
Nunziata (2010). In a study of unemployment in OECD countries,
Nickell et al. find that changes in several labor market institutions
(benefits, trade union density, wage coordination, employment
protection laws, and labor taxes) explain approximately 55 percent of
the rise in unemployment that occurred in Europe over a thirty-five
year period. Bowdler and Nunziata consider how labor market
characteristics affect the sacrifice ratio and conclude that a negative
relationship exists between wage coordination and sacrifice ratios of
OECD countries.
In the theoretical model presented in Section 2.5, exchangerate pass through exerts an ambiguous influence on the sacrifice ratio,
depending on the extent of wage contracting in the economy,
represented by the parameter Ω in the theoretical model, and on the
opposing effects of pass through operating through the direct
domestic-price and the indirect exchange-rate channels. The
comparative statics of the model for the all-contracting economy imply
that an enlarged degree of pass through operating through the direct
domestic-price channel results in a larger sacrifice ratio, while
operating through the indirect exchange-rate channel it results in a
lower sacrifice ratio. Opposite conclusions hold for the economy
without nominal rigidities.
Daniels et al. (2006, page 984) contend that union density is
the best proxy measure of the share of firms with nominal wage
contracts. Hence, Model 9 of Table 4 includes Union Density (from
Visser, 2009), which covers our full sample and, as shown in Table 1,
varies over country and time. Consistent with Bowdler and Nunziata
(Table 3, Model 4), the relationship between Union Density and the
sacrifice ratio is positive, indicating that the sacrifice ratio is increased
in economies with greater wage contracting; however, in contrast to
Bowdler and Nunziata, it is also significant at the 5 percent level in our
model. Model fit improves with the inclusion of this variable and Pass
Through remains positive and significant.
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Model 10 of Table 4 adds the interaction of Pass Through and
Union Density. This model suffers from multicollinearity, so the
significance level for the individual effects of Pass Through and Union
Density fall just outside of the 10 percent and 5 percent level
respectively while the two individual effects along with their interaction
term are jointly significant (with a p-value of less than 1 percent). 10
Evaluated at the mean value for Union Density, the total effect of Pass
Through is positive, statistically significant, and increasing with greater
Union Density, as predicted by the model if pass through operating
through the indirect exchange-rate channel more than offsets the
effect operating through the direct domestic-price channel. These
results suggest that further study of the importance of the degree of
nominal wage rigidity as a conditioning factor may be a potentially
useful path for future research.
We also consider a model that omits potential outliers. We
assume a standard threshold for the DFITS statistic of 2 times the
square root of the number of independent variables (k) divided by the
number of observations (n), 2·(k/n). Based on this threshold, we
identify two outliers, Finland (1989–1996, also identified as an outlier
by Bowdler), and Italy (1977–1978, which was not included in
Bowdler's sample). For these two observations, Finland had an
exceptionally large sacrifice ratio (10.529, which is more than two
standard deviations greater than the mean), and Italy exhibited a very
large drop in inflation of 13.57 percent over only a one-year
disinflationary period. The results provided in Table 5 indicate that
standard measures of model fit were lower under this approach and
that there were no noteworthy differences in the signs and significance
levels for the variables of interest.
Table 5. Sacrifice ratio estimates for 20 countries, 1975–2004.a Omitted
Outliers Estimation (robust standard errors in second row).

Length
Inflation
ΔInflation
CBI

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

0.6286***

0.6233***

0.6177***

0.6089***

0.6177*** 0.6177***

0.1228

0.1282

0.1223

0.1259

0.1240

0.1222

0.0626

0.0659

0.0611

0.0548

0.0610

0.0572

0.0510

0.0531

0.0519

0.0544

0.0538

0.0538

−0.1948*

−0.1995*

−0.1921*

−0.1813

−0.1920*

−0.1878*

0.1003

0.1016

0.1011

0.1059

0.1039

0.1025

1.0491*

1.0748*

1.0233*

0.9942*

1.0761

2.1175***
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Model 1
0.5391
Openness

Model 2
0.5257

−0.0205***
0.0059

Pass Through

Model 3
0.4932

Model 4
0.5273

Model 5
1.4167

Model 6
0.2943

−0.1760*** −0.0322*** −0.0167

−0.0176***

0.005

0.0074

0.0242

0.0051

0.6988**

0.4849**

−0.3380

0.4859**

1.2070***

0.3015

0.2299

0.4514

0.2301

0.3212

0.0247**

PT·Openness

−0.0099
−1.1435

CBI·Openness

0.8151
−1.6749**

CBI·PT

−0.5894
−0.7854

−1.8568*** −1.1178*

−0.5502

Constant

0.6074

0.6118

0.6110

0.7768

−1.5738***

Observations

67

67

67

67

67

67

R-squared

0.4698

0.4530

0.4797

0.4863

0.4797

0.4843

R-Bar

0.4254

0.4082

0.4180

0.4254

0.4709

0.4231

21.34

13.52

15.37

28.81

17.75

33.71

−1.1436

0.4577

0.8151

F

Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, ***
significant at 1% level, for two-tailed test.
a
All models control for clustering at the country level and omit
Finland (1989–1996) and Italy (1977–1978) as outliers.
*

The introduction of the euro is an important structural element
that may influence the effects of CBI, openness, and pass through on
the sacrifice ratio as well as their interactions. There were two euromember nations that experienced a disinflation episode after the
introduction of the euro: Ireland in 2001 and Portugal in 2001.
Dropping these two observations from Model 3 had no substantive
effect on our results. Country size may also be an element that plays
an important role in our results. To consider this possibility, we
included in Model 3 a dummy variable that assumes a value of unity
for those nations for which 2004 real GDP (measured in U.S. dollars
and from the OECD Main economic Indicators) was below the median
value for the group included in our analysis. This variable was not
statistically significant; its only important effect on the results was to
reduce the p-value of the estimated coefficients on Openness and Pass
Through.
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Finally, Bowdler suggests the impact of the degree of openness
and its interaction with the level of central bank independence may
have changed along with monetary policymaking after 1980. We also
introduced a single dummy variable to evaluate the effect of our
inclusion of the earlier sample period, coding years 1975 through 1980
as one and all subsequent years as zero. The coefficient estimate for
this variable was statistically insignificant, and its presence had no
implication (other than to reduce the p-value on both Openness and
Pass Through) for our general conclusions.

4. Conclusion
Considerable recent work has reached mixed conclusions about
whether and how globalization affects the output–inflation relationship.
In this paper, we have explored the implications of a simple theoretical
model allowing for the variations in extent of exchange-rate pass
through and the degree of trade openness to exert simultaneous
effects on the output–inflation trade-off. This model predicts that both
factors should have interacting effects on the sacrifice ratio.
Examination of the interaction among measures of the degree of
openness, the extent of pass through, the level of central bank
independence, the extent of wage contracting, and other factors
influencing the sacrifice ratio in cross-country data verifies the
empirical importance of the predicted interactions. On net, our results
indicate that a greater extent of pass through increases the sacrifice
ratio. Furthermore, once the extent of pass through is taken into
account alongside other factors that affect the sacrifice ratio, the
degree of openness to international trade tends to have an empirically
indeterminate effect on the sacrifice ratio.
Thus, our results suggest that considerable work must be done
to better understand whether and how greater openness influences the
output–inflation relationship. In light of the numerous structural
elements that can impinge on the potential relationship between the
degree of openness and the sacrifice ratio, it may be appropriate for
future studies of this relationship to focus attention on evidence
revealed from time-series data from individual countries instead of
cross-country data.
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In this model the total marginal effect of Pass Through is the sum of the
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